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This paper argues that the environmental provisions of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation (NAAEC) have been ineffective at preventing environmental harm because 
of weak enforcement mechanisms. The agreements sacrificed the potential benefits of 
linking trade and environmental issues by failing to impose trade penalties for 
environmental infractions. Chapter One of the paper demonstrates how traditional 
methods of addressing global environmental issues through multiparty environmental 
agreements have proven largely ineffective. Chapter Two lays out the potentially harmful 
effects of free trade agreements like NAFTA on the environment. Chapter Three 
demonstrates how the environmental provisions of NAFTA as well as the NAAEC fail to 
impose high enough penalties to deter violations. The conclusion briefly discusses the 
recently signed United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and its 
environmental implications. 
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1Introduction: Environmental Implications of NAFTA 
In 1994, Canada, the United States and Mexico signed the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), further integrating the North American economy. Alongside 
NAFTA, the parties negotiated and signed a side agreement called the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), which was meant to force member 
nations to enforce their own environmental protections. 
Prior to NAFTA, global environmental issues had largely been addressed through 
the use of multiparty environmental agreements, which faced significant obstacles to 
enforcement. The drive to compete in the global market took precedence in national 
agendas, sidelining global environmental goals. NAFTA represented the first attempt to 
incorporate environmental provisions into a trade agreement, by coming to a parallel side 
agreement on the environment. The mechanisms created by the side agreement have 
made small improvements in specific, isolated circumstances. However, many of the 
same enforcement challenges have persisted. 
This paper argues that the environmental provisions of NAFTA and the NAAEC 
have been ineffective at preventing environmental harm because of weak enforcement 
mechanisms. The agreements sacrificed the potential benefits of linking trade and 
environmental issues by failing to impose trade penalties for environmental infractions. 
Chapter One of the paper demonstrates how traditional methods of addressing global 
environmental issues through multiparty environmental agreements have proven largely 
ineffective. Chapter Two lays out the potentially harmful effects of free trade agreements 
like NAFTA on the environment. Chapter Three demonstrates how the environmental 
2provisions of NAFTA as well as the NAAEC fail to impose high enough penalties to 
deter violations. 
In the conclusion, I briefly examine the recently signed United States-Mexico-
Canada Agreement (USMCA) and its environmental implications. While the USMCA 
promotes environmental issues to the main text, rather than relegating them to a side 
agreement, it does not improve the weak enforcement mechanism put in place by 
NAFTA. Moving forward, agreements addressing both trade and environment should 
more fully link these issues by imposing trade penalties or fees for environmental 
infractions. 
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Chapter 1: The Limited Success of Multiparty Environmental Agreements 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 
Issues such as pollution have been a topic of discussion among global leaders for 
30 years.1 Concerns about the effect of industry on the air and water began in a domestic 
context but soon rose to the level of international importance, as the environmental 
movement matured and it became clear that its concerns transcended national boundaries. 
Modern environmentalism is the heir of conservationist movements that arose in 
the 19th century, when some people began to call for the conservation of wildlife and 
natural landscapes.2 This growing concern with the environment led to the development 
of resource management principles and eventually reached the international level: In 
1900 European nations signed the first international convention, on conserving animal 
species in Africa; in 1902, the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea was 
formed.3 The United Nations formed in 1945, signaling greater international cooperation 
more broadly.4 True cooperation on environmental issues did not occur until after World 
War II, however.5  
After the war, there was a rush to industrialize and grow the economy, which 
caused greater and greater environmental pollution.6 Smog and soot in the air caused 
coughing and other respiratory problems, while beaches and lakes would sometimes close 
                                                
1  Steinar Andresen, Elin Lerum Boasson and Geir Henneland, “An international environmental policy 
takes shape,” International Environmental Agreements: An Introduction, Routledge (2012), 4.  
2 Ibid., 10.  
3 Ibid., 10-11.  
4 Ibid., 11.  
5 Ibid., 10.  
6 Ibid., 12.  
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down because of water contaminants. Even when water sites were open, plastic and other 
garbage was often visible floating downstream.7 
This was the context for Rachel Carson's movement-creating book, Silent Spring, 
which highlighted the threats to various animal populations posed by chemical pollution.8 
In the United States and Western Europe, critics of economic growth pointed out the 
havoc being wreaked on the environment and sparked a popular environmentalist 
movement.9 In 1968, astronauts on the first Apollo mission returned with photos of earth, 
further inspiring the environmental movement, and in 1970 the U.S. government 
recognized the first Earth Day.10 All of this environmental concern led to legislation such 
as the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act in the United States. 
That movement eventually went international: The first international 
environmental organization was the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) which formed in 
1961.11 Greenpeace, established in 1979, later took over as the main lobbyist and popular 
campaigner for environmental protection.12  
One reason environmental issues lent themselves to international action is that 
they were rarely confined to the borders of one country. Such international environmental 
problems arise where “the responsible activity, the impacts of that activity, or the concern 
about (and solutions to) those impacts do not all exist within one country’s borders.”13 
Even a problem that physically exists only within a country’s borders may become 
                                                
7 Speth, 57. 
8 Andresen, 12.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Speth, 57. 
11 Andresen, 11.  
12 Ibid.  
13 Ronald B. Mitchell, International Politics and Environment, Ronald Mitchell (2010), 23. 
5international if other countries are concerned about the problem and if there are 
advantages to international cooperation.14 
For example, some of the first conservation-related treaties were related to 
hunting of whales and seals. Because both groups were hunted by multiple countries in 
international waters, their harvest led to competition and sometimes even violence. In the 
case of the seals, in 1886 the US captured and confiscated and Canadian ship hunting 
seals off the U.S. coast, leading to an international crisis that eventually led to a bilateral 
agreement between the United States and Great Britain.15 In 1931, countries signed a 
whaling convention to prevent similar crises.16 
There are two broad responses possible to mounting environmental challenges: 
the governmental, regulatory approach, and the voluntary approach whereby private 
actors forego environmentally harmful products and practices.17 
The government approach could be unilateral and domestic or international. The 
first option may be useful where one country is causing the bulk of the problem; for 
example, the United States passed regulation in the 1970s prohibiting the production of 
products with ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and thereby drastically 
reduced CFCs released into the atmosphere.18 However, where solving the problem 
requires sacrifices, multiparty cooperation is usually necessary because of the scope of 
the problem and because of the disincentive of individual governments to act against their 
own economic interest.19 In the case of the U.S. ozone regulations, CFCs began to rise 
14 Mitchell, 24.
15 Scott Barrett, Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making, Oxford Press
(2003) 27.  
16  Mitchell, 227.
17 Ibid., 53.
18 Ibid., 54.
19 Ibid., 55.
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again in the 1980s until international action was taken by establishing a global regulatory 
system.20 
Where, as with CFCs, the problem can only be solved through international 
cooperation, the traditional approach has been to sign a legally binding treaty, often 
called a convention where it involves more than two parties.21 In theory, parties could 
enter into agreement: informally, where parties agree on what needs to be done and then 
tackle the issue separately, and formally, where there is binding language compelling 
action.22 However, usually to be taken seriously and solicit enough of a response, parties 
need to write an actual law and bind themselves to the agreement.23 
The traditional method of dealing with environmental problems involving 
multiple countries is to establish a multilateral environmental agreement (MEA).24  Such 
multi-party agreements also often establish a permanent secretariat that facilitates 
negotiations between the parties, among other functions depending on the treaty.25 It has 
also been common to use a convention-protocol approach: first, countries sign a 
convention agreeing on goals and a framework for future action.26 
In 1972, 120 nations attended the Stockholm Conference on the Human 
Environment, which set a precedent for coming to international agreements to resolve 
environmental problems.27 Overall, 114 government representatives attended the 
                                                
20 Ibid., 54-55. 
21 Andresen, 15.  
22 Speth, 55. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Andresen, 4.  
25 Ibid., 15.  
26 Lawrence E. Susskind and Salim H. Ali, Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global 
Agreements Oxford (2015) 30-31. 
27 Andresen, 3, 12.  
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conference, 134 NGOs participated in unofficial side meetings.28 The Stockholm 
Conference agreed on the “polluter pays” principle and created the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP).29 Stockholm represented the first time nongovernmental 
entities played a major role in an international conference.30  
Since Stockholm, there have been an increasing number of conferences, 
negotiations, agreements, and other action plans related to global environmental 
stewardship.31 The conference led to several agreements on “classic” environmental 
issues such as wildlife protection.32 There are hundreds of environmental agreements now 
- most are bilateral or regional, as environmental issues can be more easily addressed at 
lower levels.33 During the 1970s and 80s, treaties were signed regarding water and air 
pollution as well as ozone depletion.34 Regional air pollution was addressed in the 
Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution in 1979.35  
Several events in the 1980s once more reinvigorated the push for environmental 
protection: the accident with the nuclear reactor in Chernobyl (1986) and the appearance 
of a hole in the ozone layer over Antarctica.36 NGOs and journalists were active in the 
environmental space at that point and thus made sure that these events received plenty of 
public attention.37  
                                                
28 Speth, 59. 
29 Andresen, 12.  
30 Speth, 60. 
31 Ibid., 52. 
32 Andresen, 3.  
33 Andresen, 14.  
34 Andresen, 4.  
35 Ibid., 61-62. 
36 Ibid., 12.  
37 Speth, 65. 
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Meanwhile, traditional conservationist principles were making their way into 
international agreements such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of World Flaura and Fauna (CITES) and the Convention on the Protection of the 
World’s Cultural and Natural Heritage. The World Heritage Convention designated 
important environmental spaces such as the Great Barrier Reef, Galapagos Natural Park, 
and Yellowstone National Park as World Heritage sites.38  
In the 1970s, however, only the early signs of an agenda regarding truly global 
concerns were taking shape. The issues at Stockholm issues were basically local: water 
and air pollution, infrastructure construction, strip mining and clear cutting.39 Scientific 
groups were releasing studies on ozone depletion and climate change at that time, but 
treaties were not yet addressing those high-level concerns.40 
In addition, these earlier treaties called out the problem and set out ambitious 
plans for action, with no prescribed targets.41 They functioned largely as knowledge-
sharing or norm-setting arrangements. A good example of a knowledge sharing approach 
is UNEP’s large-scale project of creating databases for information sharing purposes. In 
the early 1980s, UNEP had already set about crafting procedures for information 
exchange and was organizing and mobilizing networks of scientists to study 
environmental issues.42  
Other treaties focused on setting an international norm in hopes of moving all 
countries in a similar ideological direction. One important norm-setting document is the 
United Nations publication, released in 1987, called Our Common Future, which 
                                                
38 Ibid., 62. 
39 Ibid., 61. 
40 Ibid., 62. 
41 Speth, 76 
42 Speth, 65. 
9champions the idea of “sustainable development.” At the time of its release, it was meant 
to recommit developed nations to mitigating the effects of industrialization while helping 
undeveloped nations to grow their economies in a responsible, environmentally conscious 
manner.43 The report famously defined sustainable development as development that 
meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.44 
Later agreements often set numerical targets and deadlines, imitating the Montreal 
Protocol to address ozone depletion.45 For example, in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on 
climate change, parties committed to reducing emissions of six greenhouse gases by 
2008-2012.46 These targets indicate that treaty drafters are attempting to do more than set 
norms or share knowledge: they are trying to set enforceable rules. As scholars have 
pointed out, that’s an ambitious task in an anarchic international space lacking a single 
authority.47 
In addition, from the start of the interest in international environmental issues, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have played a substantial role.48 If Stockholm 
marked the beginning of widespread NGO involvement in international policymaking, in 
1992 the initiation of the World Business Council alongside the official Summit at Rio 
marked a new openness to involving business leaders in meeting environmental goals.49 
Since the 2002 World Summit in Johannesburg, there has been a focus on multi-
43 Andresen, 12.
44 Speth, 67.
45 Ibid., 16.
46 Speth, 76.
47 Andresen, 5-6.
48 Andresen, 5.
49 Speth, 69.
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stakeholder processes involving environmental groups, governments, and corporate 
actors working together to plan and remedy issues.50 
In fact, today a number of multinational corporations have taken stronger, more 
creative action on environmental protection than some countries.51 For example, Home 
Depot and Unilever have both committed to purchasing forest and fish products produced 
sustainably and justly -- likely not enough to solve the deforestation problem altogether, 
but still a substantial step.52 
Yet the relationship of corporations to the environmental movement has often 
been more strained. During the 1960s and 70s, the burgeoning movement and its 
spokespeople, such as Ralph Nader and Rachel Carson, vilified corporations as the cause 
of the world’s environmental problems.53 
In 1992, nations met in Rio de Janeiro for the Conference on the Environment and 
Development (UNCED).54 The UN had announced the conference four years earlier, with 
the stated purpose of determining how to actually implement the idea of sustainable 
development that had been hashed out by the Brundtland Commission.55  UNCED made 
it clear for the entire world that environmental issues were now as important as the 
traditional subjects of international concern, such as politics and economics.56 
The UNCED Summit laid out a policy framework for global environmental 
governance that included social and economic development, conservation and 
management of resources for development, strengthening the role of major groups, 
                                                
50 Andresen, 13.  
51 Speth, 53. 
52 Ibid., 54. 
53 Ibid., 57. 
54 Andresen, 4.  
55 Speth, 65. 
56 Ibid., 69. 
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including non-state actors and interest groups such as NGOs, businesses, scientists, 
workers, trade unions, and farmers.57 But the question remained, how effectively would 
this innovative policy framework be in implementation? 
PROBLEMS WITH ENFORCEMENT 
In the early 1980s, UNEP was making plans to develop international 
environmental law as a means of addressing both local and truly global environmental 
concerns.58 Between Stockholm in 1972 and Johannesburg in 2002, governments have 
relied heavily on these formal agreements. Because of that, international environmental 
law is well developed, but there is still considerable work to be done in the political 
scientists’ arena, of determining the conditions under which environmental law is 
successfully implemented.59 
More recently, political scientists have began to theorize on precisely that point. 
For example, Andresen has pointed out that enforcement regimes need to be designed 
appropriate to the problem at hand. Some problems are “malign”, that is, characterized by 
political disagreements and asymmetries of power, as well as scientific uncertainty, that 
make solutions more elusive. For example, both climate change and biodiversity are 
considered malign problems, while the more benign ozone issue has been more 
effectively addressed by multiparty environmental agreements.60 
It can be difficult to measure the effectiveness of MEAs because the causal link 
between the agreement and the environmental change is not always clear.61 For example, 
in the early 1960s the International Whaling Commission had recently increased its 
                                                
57 Speth, 70. 
58 Ibid., 62. 
59 Ibid., 55. 
60 Andresen, 9.  
61 Ibid., 8.  
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regulation of whaling, and there was a corresponding drop in the number of whales 
hunted globally. However, the drop in the whaling numbers actually had more to do with 
the decimated whale population -- there were so few whales left, they were harder to 
find.62 
Mitchell defines certain categories of problem to inquire whether certain problem 
structures lend themselves to different solutions. Over-appropriation problems occur 
where resources are consumable and non-shareable, such that people are incentivized to 
consume as much as possible before others do. Degradation problems occur where 
resources are shareable, but one persons activities may reduce the resources’ quality (for 
example, air pollution).63 
International collaboration on environmental issues can interfere with national 
efforts to address the same problems.64 Where there are deep-seated political conflicts 
over an issue, MEAs are harder to reach and enforce.65 
MEA’s can be viewed as an infringement on the sovereign rights of nations-- a 
subject of particular concern for post-colonial states. For example, in Stockholm in 1972, 
the common principles arrived at by negotiating parties acknowledged eh sovereign right 
of nations to exploit resources within their own borders, while also recognizing the 
responsibility of nations to prevent their activity from causing environmental problems in 
other countries.66 
Thus, despite successfully agreeing to numerical targets in the Montreal Protocol, 
today a number of international agreements still fail to arrive at those crucial agreements. 
                                                
62 Andresen, , 8.  
63 Mitchell, 30-32.  
64 Andresen, 4.  
65 Andresen, 9.  
66 Speth, 59-60. 
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For example, the Copenhagen accord on global climate change in 2009 never mentions 
any shared global goal in terms of emissions. Prior the agreement, the plan had been to 
reduce global emissions by 50% by 2050, but there was pressure from China not to set 
and hold to any specific number.67 
Another major impediment to international environmental cooperation has been 
the preeminence of free trade as a national goal and the drive for developing nations to 
prioritize industrialization over environmental protection.  
The push to integrate development with environmental protection has come in 
large part from developing countries, which is a function of timing: As developed nations 
completed industrialization during the 20th century and realized the extent of the 
processes’ negative impacts on the environment, the global south was craving the same 
industrialization to remedy widespread poverty and political inefficacy.68 These southern 
countries were often newly independent and, freed from their colonial masters, were 
eager to increase their economic power and improve their populations’ living 
conditions.69 Thus the South became industrialists just as the North became 
environmentalist. Naturally, environmental and trade concerns would become linked. 
Under such conditions the global South aimed to catch up economically while 
also calling on richer nations to pay for environmental protection, because the 
industrialized nations were the biggest polluters the first place.70 In this view, 
environmental regulations is a means for wealthy, industrialized nations to impose trade 
67 James Urpelainen, Global Environmental Politics in the Twenty-First Century (pre-publication draft,
October 2017), delivered to LBJ School Class taught by Joshua Busby.  
68 Andresen, 14.  
69 Speth, 58. 
70 Ibid., 58. 
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barriers on poor nations, which lack the capacity to impose expensive environmental 
protection programs.71   
Thus the Brundtland Commission’s report, which was accepted and adopted by 
the UN Assembly in 1987, emphasized that environmental and developmental goals  due 
to links between environmental degradation and poverty.72 The extent to which this 
proposition stands up to scrutiny is debatable, but it served the interests of both the global 
north and south at the time it was written. Later, at Rio, negotiators linked poverty 
alleviation and development assistance with environmental goals.73 This argument 
characterized many of the discussions that took place in Rio in 1992, where the 
international community ultimately failed to achieve an agreement that ensured subsidies 
and support from the North.74 
Today, the global environmental discussion continues to be characterized by a 
“tug of war,” as Speth and Has call it, between developed countries who are battling 
pollution and developing countries who are battling poverty.75 The North and South 
frequently disagree over whether the North should provide funding over and above 
normal official aid, and if so, whether it should be provided with strings attached.76 
Commitments at conferences like Rio are not binding, so the ideals articulated at these 
conferences may not translate into actual agreements.77  
In the 1990s, the intersection between international trade and environmental 
protection was becoming more controversial. Free trade agreements meant to lower 
                                                
71 Dale Colyer, Agriculture and Environmental Issues in Free Trade Agreements, The Este Centre Journal 
of International Law and Trade Policy, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2003) 127. 
72 Speth, 67. 
73 Ibid.,  70. 
74 Esty, 26.  
75 Speth,59. 
76 Susskind, 16-17. 
77 Andresen, 14.  
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barriers to foreign markets were, in the view of some groups, beginning to whittle away 
individual countries’ power to impose environmental protective measures.78 For example, 
the US and Norway went head to head over whaling, China and Taiwan fought over trade 
in tiger and rhino ivory, while Mexico had concerns about tuna and dolphins, Japan with 
sea turtles, and Brazil over the rainforest.79  
The reasons for these rising controversies include scientific advancements that 
made environmental degradation more visible, while at the same time the global 
economy was becoming ever more integrated.80 Pressure to compete in the global 
marketplace make it difficult to convince nations to impose costs on their own industries 
-- even if those costs protect the globe’s environmental health.81 
Around the same time, a fierce debate also arose between environmentalists and 
the trade policy community over the consequences of free trade.82 Early on, those debates 
occurred in the context of NAFTA negotiations and the Uruguay Round of GATT.83 
Those critical of an integrated global economy made several arguments: first and 
foremost, free trade would undermine nations’ attempts to institute environmental 
protections. Trade of any kind in theory undermines domestic regulation, because foreign 
producers are not subject to the regulations and their prices may undercut domestically 
products. One way of protecting domestic industries under such circumstances would be 
to impose trade restrictions such as tariffs -- but international trade agreements limit 
                                                
78 Esty. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Esty, 11, 20.  
81 Esty, 4. 
82 Brian R. Copeland and M. Scott Taylor, “Trade, Growth and Environment,” Journal of Economic 
Literature Vol. XLII (March 2004) 7. 
83 Ibid., 7. 
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nations’ freedom to impose such restrictions.84 In this sense, liberalized trade threatened 
efforts at environmental protection. 
In addition, the industries themselves that grow larger in a free market 
environment would use up natural resources. Mass industry tends to cause more 
pollution, which led to the environmental movement in the first place. The effect would 
be two-fold because industry will grow and so will the transportation of goods, which 
also costs energy. Thus the timber trade decreases biodiversity by over-harvesting forests, 
while the transport of the lumber internationally increases greenhouse gas emissions.85 
Finally, opponents of free trade predicted that industries that pollute heavily will move to 
countries where pollution regulations are less stringent. This “pollution haven” 
hypothesis is based on the fact that, economically speaking, a country’s comparative 
advantage in dirty industries suffers when it imposes pollution regulations.86 
Those who argued for free trade said trade agreements could help rather than 
harm the environment. Agreements could be protective, meant to alleviate the deleterious 
effects of trade, or they could be designed to be offensive, meant to use trade as a tool to 
raise environmental standards.87 In this view, so long as there are enforcement 
mechanisms, getting nations to sign on to free trade agreements – on condition of 
enforcing high environmental standards – could actually improve environmental 
protections.  
                                                
84 Larry Karp, “The Environment and Trade,” Annual Review of Resource Economics, Vol. 3 (2011) 399. 
85 Sikina Jinnah. Secretariat Influence on Overlap Management North America: NAFTA and the 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Review of Policy Research, Vol 32, Issue 1. 125. Accessed at 
https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/doi/epdf/10.1111/ropr.12106.  
86 Karp, 400. 
87 Esty, 2. 
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Additionally, proponents argued, trade in green technologies could also improve 
the way humans interact with the environment.88 Free trade “changes relative goods 
prices by opening up the economy to increased foreign competition.” The growth caused 
by free trade “improves technology at given external prices.”89 Because trade leads to 
growth that makes technology cheaper, there is an argument to be made that free trade 
actually leads to greater environmental protections. Technology challenges the pollution 
haven hypothesis and complicates the relationship between free trade and environmental 
protection: trade in green technology, then, may actually help mitigate the effects of 
industrialization.90 
Debates like this eventually led to the incorporation of environmental provisions 
into trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
However, the effectiveness of those provisions is yet to be established. In addition, as 
trade and economic development began to take center stage, efforts to arrive at more 
effective multilateral treaties began to lag. 
In 1992, the nations that gathered in Rio committed to sustainable development, 
and in the wake of the conference, many in the international community were optimistic 
that wealthier nations would agree to subsidize the sustainable development of the 
globe.91 After Rio, however, developed nations failed to substantially aid developing 
nations with sustainable industrialization, and in 1997 when nations met to review 
progress since the Rio Conference, no new agreements were produced and the optimism 
of five years earlier had all but disappeared.92 
                                                
88 Jinnah, 125-126.  
89 Copeland, 24. 
90 See Arik Levinson, “Technology, International Trade, and Pollution from U.S. Manufacturing,” 
American Economic Review (2009) 99:5, 2177. 
91 Andresen, 12.  
92 Ibid., 13.  
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According to Speth and Has, the ambitious scope of the Rio conference goals was 
part of its own undoing. Implementing UNCED would depend on strong leadership, 
enough financial resources, and strong institutions to monitor and enforce change -- none 
of which were forthcoming.93 
There were some treaties signed that built on the momentum on Rio, including 
conventions on desertification, trade in hazardous chemicals, cancer-causing Persistent 
Organic Pollutants and -- notably -- the Kyoto Protocol on climate change.94 But ahead of 
the next World Summit in 2002, there was broad consensus that Rio had failed because 
industrial countries had not lived up to their commitments.95 And in Johannesburg in 
2002, the attending nations failed to set any new verifiable goals or solve the problem of 
implementing sustainable development.96 
Importantly, one major explanation for why the optimism of Rio did not produce 
any real results is that globalization proved to be a stronger force than environmental 
movement.97 Not only do developing nations prioritize industry over environment, 
market-based economic integration has also garnered much stronger support from 
wealthy nations than the environmental agenda; “trade not aid” is the order of the day.98 
93 Speth, 70.
94 Ibid., 74.
95 Ibid., 76.
96 Ibid.
97 Speth, 79.
98 Ibid., 80.
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Chapter 2: NAFTA’s Potential Negative Environmental Effects 
Unlike multilateral environmental conventions, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement is not primarily an agreement over methods to protect the environment. In 
fact, the “Statement of Objectives” within the agreement makes no mention at all of 
environmental goals.99 However, NAFTA was the first U.S. trade agreement to 
incorporate environmental provisions.100  
Following NAFTA’s signing on January 1, 1994, the deal led to a slew of other 
free trade agreements across the globe.101 As early as June of the same year, Mexico, 
Colombia, and Venezuela signed their own agreement, and in December the U.S. 
President met with 33 leaders from countries in the Western Hemisphere to contemplate 
an eventual trade deal meant to encompass all of the Americas.102 By the 2000s, the 
United States alone was signing free trade agreements with Singapore, Morocco, Chile, 
and Jordan, among other countries.103 
When NAFTA was first announced in 1990, it split the environmental 
community. Some worried that it would exacerbate environmental problems; others 
hoped to use the agreement proactively as a tool to raise standards in Mexico.104 Major 
environmental interest groups fell on opposite sides of the divide, with groups such as 
National Wildlife Federation, the National Audubon Society, the Environmental Defense 
                                                
99 Paulette L. Stenzel. Can NAFTA’s Environmental Provisions Promote Sustainable Development? 
Albany Law Review (1995) 59, 423. Retrieved from https://advance-lexis-
com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/api/document?collection=analytical-materials&id=urn:contentItem:3S3T-
VYG0-00CW-2044-00000-00&context=1516831. 
100 Stenzel, 59, 423. 
101 James McBride and Mohammed Aly Sergie, NAFTA’s Economic Impact, Council on Foreign Relations 
(Oct. 1, 2018) Accessed at https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/naftas-economic-impact.  
102 Stenzel, 59, 423.  
103 David L. Markell, The North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation After Ten Years: 
Lessons About Institutional Structure and Public Participation in Governance, 26 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. 
L. Rev. 341 (Spring 2004) 
104 Esty, 28.  
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Fund, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Nature Conservancy supporting 
the deal, and Sierra Club, Greenpeace, Public Citizen, and the Clean Water Fund 
opposing it.105 
The debate between these groups was invigorated by a trade dispute between the 
United States and Mexico which was finally resolved in 1991. The dispute centered on 
tuna fishing and the risk it posed to dolphins. The U.S. had passed a law banning the 
import of Mexican tuna caught using a specific type of net that killed dolphins in the 
course of catching the fish.106 The U.S. loss at the WTO made it seem as though 
increasing global trade would put domestic environmental protections at risk.107 (Later, 
the WTO/GATT dispute resolution panel partially overturned a similar case involving sea 
turtles, but that failed to assuage concerns about the trade v. environment conflict.108)  
There was little hope from the environmental community that international 
structures meant to promote the lowering of trade barriers would effectively protect 
environmental regulations. Even where the law has text that could be interpreted to 
secure such protections, the WTO arbitration panels have tended to go the other way. 
GATT Article XX, for example,  allows members to pass laws inconsistent with GATT 
disciplines but necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health (paragraph (b)), 
or relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources (paragraph (g)).109 
 However, the way GATT Article XX has been interpreted sets a high hurdle for 
proving a domestic regulation is not a trade barrier. The restriction must be “necessary to 
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protect human, animal, and plant life or health.” This phrase has been narrowly construed 
to mean that no less GATT-inconsistent policy tool is available, setting a very high 
hurdle.110 In the tuna/dolphin case, the U.S. used as its authority GATT Article XX and 
claimed that the law was necessary for the “conservation of natural resources”.111 Its 
attempt to use Article XX in this protective manner was unsuccessful. Ever since, the 
WTO has been a subject of criticism by the environmental community and it has yet to 
establish a clear scope as to what types of environmentally motivated regulations are 
allowed under GATT rules.112 
These concerns surrounding international trade put pressure on the U.S. 
presidential administration to incorporate some explicit environmental protections into 
NAFTA. These provisions were incorporated via an environmental “side agreement” 
called the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation.113 This 
environmental side agreement – alongside another side agreement – was critical for 
winning support for NAFTA in the Senate.114 
The choice to arrive at separate side agreements rather than addressing 
environmental concerns as a part of trade negotiations angered some people in the 
environmentalist community. There were some NAFTA provisions with potentially 
negative environmental ramifications, but negotiating a separate environmental-specific 
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document meant that those provisions would not be clarified or re-worded to mitigate 
harmful effects. Additionally, the side agreement had to be negotiated in haste during the 
lapsing period where President Clinton enjoyed “fast track” implementation authority, 
granted by Congress.115 
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Chapter 3: How NAFTA and the NAAEC Address Environmental Issues 
The NAAEC is the primary mechanism drafted to address environmental issues. 
However, before diving into the side agreement, I will examine the several provisions 
within NAFTA itself that are relevant to environmental regulations:116 
 NAFTA’s preamble states that trade must be conducted in a “manner 
consistent with environmental protection and conservation.”117 Article 104 within the 
“Objectives” section of the agreement state that the requirements of several international 
environmental agreements prevail over NAFTA in the event of any inconsistency.118 One 
of the most relevant sections is Chapter 7, “Agriculture and Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures,” which states: 
Each Party may, in accordance with this Section, adopt, maintain or apply any 
sanitary or phytosanitary measure necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant 
life or health in its territory, including a measure more stringent than an international 
standard, guideline or recommendation.119 
In Article 903 the Parties affirm the right of each Party to abide by international 
agreements, “including environmental and conservation agreements.”120 NAFTA lists 
three multilateral environmental agreements that supersede the Agreement in the event of 
inconsistency.121 
In Article 21, parties state:  
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The Parties understand that the measures referred to in GATT Article 
XX(b) include environmental measures necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health, and that GATT Article XX(g) applies to 
measures relating to the conservation of living and non-living exhaustible 
natural resources.122 
However, considering how GATT Article XX has been interpreted by the WTO 
arbitration panels, this is likely not a very protective provision.  
The side agreement to NAFTA is meant to ensure that all three nations maintain 
high environmental standards. The agreement is called the North American Agreement 
on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC). The side agreement requires all party nations 
to enforce their own environmental laws, commits to information-sharing and 
cooperation on environmental issues, establishes a secretariat to implement the terms of 
the agreement, and – in a novel move by negotiators – establishes a citizen’s advisory 
committee to advise the secretariat. I will examine each of these provisions in turn. In the 
next section, I will turn to an investigation of the effectiveness of these provisions and 
make a comparison between the challenges and successes of NAAEC versus those of 
classic international environmental agreements. 
Article 3 of the NAAEC states that countries have right to maintain environmental 
laws and levels of environmental protection, commits parties to “high levels of 
environmental protection,” and articulates that parties “shall strive to continue to improve 
those laws and regulations.”123 
Article 20 of the agreement creates a platform for cooperation and information-
sharing on environmental matters.124 
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the NAAEC establishes the Council on 
Environmental Cooperation, which serves as a the Secretariat for the agreement. The 
CEC operates on three principles that NAFTA countries were able to agree upon: (1) 
They agreed no country will become a pollution haven to attract investment; (2) They 
created rules about how regulations could be used to protect human and environmental 
health; and (3) they gave priority to multilateral treaties such as the WTO.125 
The CEC’s role is to address North American environmental concerns, prevent 
conflict between trade and environmental goals, and ensure enforcement of 
environmental protection laws.126 To that end, it cooperates with the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission to implement environmental goals, it serves as  a contact point for citizens 
and nonprofits regarding environmental concerns, and (at least in theory) it administers a 
dispute resolution process. Its budget has been $9 million a year since 1996, involving 
equal contributions from each country127 
The CEC’s structure in includes the governing Council, composed of 
environmental ministers from each member country, a secretariat to provide technical, 
administrative, and operational support, and a joint public advisory committee (JPAC) 
made up of five citizens from each country and which meets annually to issue 
recommendations to the Council.128  
The Secretariat’s administrative headquarters are located in Montreal, with a 
liaison office in Mexico City. The Executive Director is selected by the Council to serve 
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three-year terms and must then rotate nationalities.129 The Secretariat annually prepares 
draft program plans and budgets but must submit these drafts for approval from the 
Council.130 The CEC Secretariat is actually empowered with more latitude than is the 
case in prior international agreements. The Secretariat may prepare a report for the 
Council on “any matter within the scope of the annual program,” and – with prior 
approval of Council – “any other environmental matter related to the cooperative 
functions of the Agreement.”131 The language of the Agreement empowers the Secretariat 
to produce reports on environmental issues even where there is not yet consensus on the 
causes or solutions among the states132. 
The Secretariat is also empowered to investigate claims that parties are violating 
the terms of the NAAEC. Complaints are reviewed by Evaluation Committee of Experts 
and then passed along to a dispute panel if found credible. Rulings are to be enforced 
using trade or monetary penalties.133 Any third-party claim filed with the CEC sets off a 
set of procedures to evaluate the claim and potentially arbitrate the dispute. Private 
parties or the three party nations to the treaty may submit a claim.134 Complaints are 
reviewed by Evaluation Committee of Experts and then passed along to a dispute panel if 
found credible. Rulings are to be enforced using trade or monetary penalties.135 A 
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complaint is evaluated for its validity; if it is found valid, the CEC may convene an 
arbitral panel.136  
A valid complaint must allege that a country is not enforcing an environmental 
law pertaining to products that are traded between the three nations or that are produced 
by export-competing industries. The complainant then bears the burden of demonstrating 
(1) environmental injury to itself, and (2) a persistent pattern of failure by the party to 
effectively enforce its environmental law. A persistent pattern is defined as “a sustained 
or recurring course of action or inaction.” One single failure is likely not enough.137 
In addition to the CEC, the Agreement established the Joint Public Advisory 
Committee. This body is made up of five citizens from each of the three countries and 
may “provide advice to the Council on any matter within the scope of the Agreement.” 
These citizens are meant to represent the North American public, as distinct from the 
state structures alone.138 
Between 1994 and 2012, the three member states have collectively invested over 
$140 million dollars in implementing the NAAEC.139 Biermann and Siebenhuner (2009) 
and Jinnah (2014) have outlined ways in which a Secretariat can influence policy 
decisions.140 These ways are: 
(1) Knowledge brokering and information sharing 
(2) Negotiation facilitation 
(3) Capacity building 
(4) Litigation Facilitation 
136 Sears. 
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(5) Marketing141 
The CEC has engaged in information sharing and negotiation facilitation, 
however it has done little in the way of building capacity, facilitating litigation, or 
marketing. Where it has helped share information, increase transparency, and encourage 
negotiation, it has been in limited, isolated instances, and civil society groups have had to 
take an active role in bringing the projects to their conclusion. 
General critiques of the CEC include two main arguments: One, although the 
CEC has a mechanism for arbitrating disputes, it has no real power to enforce its 
decisions.142 Two, the mechanism itself works so slowly it is relatively useless as a 
method of recourse.143 At the same time, it is much easier to challenge environmental 
regulations as trade barriers under NAFTA. As a result, the CEC is a weak and 
insufficient counterweight to the  pressure for countries to lower or bracket 
environmental protection in the name of increased trade.144 
In 2007, Jonathan Dorn evaluated the efficacy of the CEC’s complaint system in 
an article for Georgetown International Environmental Law Review. After examining 
several cases and their outcomes, Dorn pointed out three main problem areas with the 
process:  
(1) Complexity of the process. Evidenced by the fact that the majority of the 
submissions came from nonprofits rather than individuals. 
(2) Delays in review and response. Prior to 1998, only one official reviewed 
submissions. It regularly took five years for the CEC to publish a factual record. 
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(3) Lack of transparency. The challenged party’s may request confidentiality, 
screening its responses from the public in their entirety. 
(4) Lack of follow-up after publication of Factual Record. The Joint Public 
Advisory Council in 2001 advised the Council to institute some kind of follow-up 
procedure but the Council declined, stating that follow-up was a domestic concern. 
(5) Conflict of interest. The environmental ministers for all three states sit on the 
Council, meaning that a process designed to embarrass governments is also controlled by 
those governments. 
(6) No Arbitration Panel. In none of the cases did one of the other nations request 
an arbitration panel pursuant to their rights under the NAAEC, suggesting that political 
concerns essentially make obsolete that important function of the CEC.145 
Included within Dorn’s critique are both of the general elements: delays, and lack 
of follow-up, which could also be understood as failure to enforce and instead yielding to 
domestic enforcement. This is a problem as a philosophy for an international Secretariat 
like the CEC because the agreements exist precisely because domestic enforcement 
cannot be trusted. 
For instance, the requirement of the NAAEP that posed a challenge for Mexican 
lawmakers was that there was little existing case law interpreting Mexico’s 
environmental laws. Canada and the United States, by contrast, had a very robust 
jurisprudence. Because domestic court rulings would be affected by CEC decisions, and 
because the CEC wanted relative uniformity in the interpretation of each country’s laws, 
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the CEC actually administered a training program from Mexican judges to help them 
interpret their own laws in accordance with Canadian and U.S. precedent.146 
I will review examinations of effectiveness the CEC, examine the role of JPAC, 
and evaluate overall effectiveness of the NAAEC in meeting its own stated goals as well 
as the functions laid out by Biermann and Siebenhuner.  
In 2007, Jonathan Dorn evaluated the success of the citizen submission process 
under NAAEC. Between June 1995 and August 2007, 32 people filed complaints against 
Mexico. Eighteen were terminated in that time. Most of those submissions were focused 
on an industrial issue in a particular urban area. Fifty-five percent were filed by 
nonprofits and forty percent by individuals.147 Dorn examined several claims where the 
CEC established a factual record, including the following cases: Cozumel (1996), 
regarding the construction of a cruise ship pier in Quintano Roo, Mexico; Rio Magdalena 
(1997), regarding illegal discharges of wastewater into the Magdalena River; Aquanova 
(1998), regarding a shrimp farm in Isle de Conde and its impact on Mangrove forest 
ecosystems; and Metales y Derivados (1998), regarding an abandoned battery recycling 
operation with thousands of tons of hazardous waste. Several themes arise from Dorn’s 
selected cases that shed light on the effectiveness of the CEC. 
One, when the CEC deems a complaint valid and produces and publishes a 
Factual Record, civil society takes notice and puts pressure on the parties to correct the 
environmental harms at issue. However, another theme is that the efforts of civil society 
to force change result in isolated victories, compromises that give investors and industries 
their profits while making some small gestures toward environmental protection.  
146 Sears. 
147 Dorn. 
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In the Cozumel case, three nonprofits filed a complaint against Mexico for 
violations relating to a cruise ship pier being constructed in Play Paraiso, Cozumel, 
Quintano Roo. The complaint alleged that both the construction and operation of the pier 
would fatally damage two reefs in the area, and that the project had moved forward 
without an environmental impact assessment. Mexico has a law on the books called the 
General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection (the LGEEPA), 
which was passed in 1988 and serves as Mexico’s general environmental protective law. 
The Cozumel complaint alleged that the authorizing the pier construction violated 
Mexico’s own law and therefore violated the terms of the NAAEP.148  
The complaint was found valid, and the CEC went on to produce and publish a 
factual record, which included a confirmation by the government of Quintana Roo that 
the pier would damage the reef. Some hailed the publication of the record as a real step 
toward holding Mexico accountable for its actions, basically through the method of 
public shaming.149 And indeed, the publication of the record did spur some action: 
Mexico created a national marine park for the reef, downsized the pier project, improved 
the legal standard for environmental assessments, and established a trust fund for reef 
protection.150 However, despite all these gestures, the pier project did move forward, 
prompting some to declare CEC an ineffective political mechanism.151  
In the 1998 Aquanova case, the company took alleviating actions but Mexico – 
the party actually bound by the NAAEC and challenged by the complaint – took no 
action. The shrimp farm at issue, according to the complaint, was damaging local 
mangrove ecosystems by impacting fish populations and water quality. A Factual Record 
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was finally released five years later, in 2003. It showed that the farm had caused severe 
harm to a mangrove forest by obstruction a creek, violated Mexican law by destroying 
acres of forest with no attempts to save any plants or animals, and violated Mexican 
water law by discharging wastewater for two years before it had any authorization to do 
so. 152  
There was a response on the part of the company that operated the farm: The 
company ceased obstructing the creek and constructed some more sustainable 
infrastructure, returned 850 hectares of land to Mexico, and initiated a reforestation 
program. The company also reduced the maximum size of the farm by 300 hectares. 153 
However, Mexico’s response was simply to assert that there was a preliminary 
investigation going on into the violations.154 
In the Metales y Derivados, two nonprofits submitted a complaint in 1998 against 
Mexico for failing to contain hazardous materials at an abandoned lead smelting site in 
Tijuana.155 The facility recycled batteries sent from the United States.156 The owner, New 
Frontier Co., should have repatriated the waste to the United States. Instead, there were 
ongoing reports of health problems in the nearby community and violations of 
environmental law. Finally the Mexican government shut down the facility, the operator 
fled to the united States, and the site was left with 23,000 tons of mixed contaminated 
waste, including heavy metals, sulfuric acid, and more than 6,000 tonnes of lead slag.157  
                                                
152 Ibid. 
153 Dorn, NAAEC Citizen Submissions Against Mexico: An Analysis of the Effectiveness of a 
Participatory Approach to Environmental Law Enforcement, 20 Geo. Int’l Envtl. Rev. 129 (Fall 2007) 
154 Commission for Environmental Cooperation. Submission. Accessed at http://www.cec.org/sem-
submissions/aquanova. 
155 Dorn. 
156 What We Do. Environmental Health Coalition. Accessed at 
https://www.environmentalhealth.org/index.php/en/what-we-do/border-environmental-justice/metales-y-
derivados-toxic-site 
157 Dorn. 
 33 
Once more the CEC produced and published a Factual Record, which at first 
spurred little action. Mexican authorities lacked the capacity and power to extradite New 
Frontier Co.’s CEO from the United States. However, the record did drum up enough 
public outrage to pressure Mexico’s environmental minister to take some action. He 
finalized an agreement with the mayor of Tijuana and the governor Baja California for a 
five-year clean-up plan for the area. Mexico funded the first stage and successfully clean 
up 1,936 tons of above-ground hazardous waste.158 The entire cleanup was completed in 
2008, ahead of schedule, thanks to the continued efforts of Environmental Health 
Coalition and its Tijuana-based affiliate.159  
Notably, although the Metales y Derivados case does show considerable success 
in cleaning up a site, it heavily involved nonprofits in the actual work. The first round of 
clean-up was funded mostly by Mexico. However the state of Baja California later had to 
apply for a loan to finance continued cleanup efforts.160 The United States, which shipped 
the used batteries to the factory and is the home of the company’s CEO, did not 
contribute funding to the clean-up.  
According to the Environmental Health Coalition, there are 66 documented toxic 
waste sites in Mexican border states.161  Metales y Derivados may be viewed as 
somewhat of a success case, but it also represents the failure of the Mexican government 
to enforce its own environmental laws in the first place, and therefore a failure of the 
NAAEC. The Metales y Derivados case also give credence to the “pollution haven” 
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hypothesis expressed by NAFTA critics: this U.S. owned factory operated at much lower 
standards in Mexico, and its bad actions shifted the cost to non-profits and local 
government to deal with, resulting in impunity for the corporation itself.  
Moreover, in none of these cases did any of the other parties request an 
arbitration. The Secretariat can publish the factual record, but no arbitration occurs unless 
one of the member nations requests it. The fact that none did, as Dorn observes, reveals a 
conflict of interests intrinsic to the structure of the CEC itself: the Council is made up of 
the environmental ministers of each state, which means that the people in charge of an 
organization designed to publicly shame the member nations do themselves represent 
those nations.162 There is an incentive not to conduct an arbitration against another 
member country, because they do so they too may have to undergo arbitration 
proceedings.  
As for the JPAC, the organization which promised to provide more citizen and 
NGO participation in the process has proved to be relatively powerless. In 2001, JPAC 
advised the Council to create some type of follow-up mechanism to complement the 
publication of a Factual Record. As it stood, the CEC does little to follow up once the 
Record is published – leaving the public shaming and pressuring to come from NGOs and 
citizens. In the Rio Magdalena case, for instance, after the Record was published there 
was no evidence that anyone – not the municipalities nor the federal Mexican 
government – did anything to remedy the situation.163 
Despite the JPAC’s recommendation, the Council declined to adopt any new 
procedure, stating that follow-up is the responsibility and purview of domestic 
                                                
162 Dorn. 
163 Ibid. 
 35 
governments.164 In the case of Mexico, whose ability to enforce its own laws has proved 
suspect time and time again, that statement does little to answer the question of how the 
CEC acts as an enforcement mechanism.  
This brings us back to the five functions a Secretariat may serve according to 
Biermann and Siebenhuner: (1) Knowledge brokering and information sharing; (2) 
Negotiation facilitation; (3) Capacity building; (4) Litigation Facilitation; and (5) 
Marketing.165 How well does the CEC serve each of these functions? 
There is little information available on the topic of the CEC’s role in facilitating 
litigation or marketing, but certainly the Factual Records and reports that it produces may 
be used as evidence in trail proceedings. The CEC seems to de-emphasize marketing, as 
it is not widely known and directs much of its efforts toward working with private-sector 
companies rather than with the public at large.166 
In the realm of knowledge-sharing, the CEC performs relatively well. The CEC’s 
2015-2020 Strategic Plan, four of the organization’s five priorities involve some form of 
information sharing: 
(1) Working to improve conditions in vulnerable communities by sharing and 
increasing access to information, such as expanding the AirNow monitoring system to 
Mexico. 
(2) Developing guidelines for designing marine protected area networks in a 
changing climate. 
(3)  Enhancing the enforcement of environmental laws to improve the 
management of electronic 
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waste and spent lead-acid batteries, and share information on the illegal trade of 
wildlife. 
(4) Improving the comparability of data related to climate change.167 
The CEC’s website bears a host of information on the state of various ecosystems 
and projects to better understand and enforce the provisions of the NAAEC. Moreover, 
the publication of Factual Records upon receipt of complaints results in increased 
transparency and the proliferation of information that civil society can use to put pressure 
on government actors. 
In serving this function, CEC operates much like other major international 
environmental organizations with states as members, including the Secretariat for the 
United Nations Framework on Climate Change, the United Nations Environmental 
Program, and the CITES Secretariat (Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora). All of these programs publish reports and conduct 
research on their issue areas to help further discussion and eventually progress. 
CEC has not made the facilitation of negotiations  a major part of its 
programming, at least in that it does not serve as the host forum for many multi-party 
discussions. In this it is unlike UNEP, which has hosted numerous discussion between 
states on environmental issues. However, this is likely a function of CEC’s role as a 
secretariat for just three specific countries and its limited mandate to implement the 
NAAEC. Though it does not so much mediate disputes, the CEC does manage to make 
negotiations more likely by changing parties’ worst alternative to a negotiated agreement. 
The publication of a Factual Record brought international attention to issues such as the 
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shrimp farm and the pier construction, which likely spurred the challenged parties to 
more mitigation action than they otherwise would have taken. Therefore the CEC serves 
as a partner with civil society by lending the weight of three nations to the causes of 
environmental and community groups – albeit in a limited way. 
The CEC’s capacity building work has been primarily focused toward work with 
private, corporate partners in the form of efforts to “green” supply chains and improve 
green building techniques.168 This is alarming in light of the ongoing debate surrounding 
environmental protection more generally across the globe—developing nations seek 
capacity in the form of funding and technology to “green” their operations while catching 
up to the West’s level of development. However, the CEC operates in North America and 
works largely with U.S. and Canadian corporations that already have considerable 
capacity to green their own supply chains. The CEC thus directs its capacity building 
efforts toward beneficiaries that do not need the support, while neglecting to issue funds 
to Mexico with tight strings attached that require oversight and adequate enforcement of 
environmental laws. This approach to capacity building represents a sadly missed 
opportunity to tie environmental protection to financial benefits, which was the hoped-for 
outcome of linking trade and environmental protection in the first place.  
The CEC’s preference for working with corporations adds credibility to Roberto 
Sanchez’s findings that over the lifetime of NAFTA, the role of environmental 
organizations has declined while private market actors have become more powerful in the 
treaty’s implementation.169 This trend is echoed in the realm of environmental treaties, 
where nonprofits and corporations played a major role in both recent Summits, and 
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where, incidentally, very little progress was made on solidifying standards or solving the 
enforcement problem.  
Whether or not the NAAEC was effective is an important question for two 
reasons. First, the WTO has failed to arrive at a clear definition of what types of 
environmentally motivated barriers are permissible.170 Second, the proliferation of 
bilateral trade agreements and free trade zones make the “floor” provided by GATT 
somewhat obsolete.171  
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Conclusion: Failed Enforcement of the NAAEC  
The NAAEC established an information-sharing organization akin to Secretariats 
for international environmental agreements. While it was negotiated alongside NAFTA, it 
did not link environmental issues to trade in a meaningful way, because violations of 
environmental standards does not result in any trade or financial penalties.  
This failure on NAAEC’s part is particularly important to note because NAFTA 
has increased the level of integration between the North American markets, and that 
integration is growing industry in all three countries. Because industrialization has a 
negative impact on natural resources, this economic growth should be accompanied by 
higher and strongly enforced environmental standards.  
Between 1987 and 2001, trade between Mexico, Canada, and the United States 
increased 155 percent.172 In 2000, Mexico became a greater net exporter of agricultural 
products than the European Union.173 At the same time, studies show pollution in the 
U.S. has dropped: One study by Jevan Cherniwchan at the University of Alberta 
examines plant-level data to determine the effects of trade liberalization on the pollutants 
emitted by individual plants, using NAFTA as an example.174 Cherniwchan finds that 
changes in tariffs correlated with decreases in pollutants emitted by U.S. plants.175 He 
theorizes that NAFTA caused production to shift from less productive plants to more 
productive plants, who could more profitably take advantage of the new Mexican market 
and the cheaper, imported Mexican inputs (the assumption being that the more productive 
                                                
172 T. Vollrath, “Gauging NAFTA's success and confronting future challenges,” AgExporter, 16(1), 7 
(2004) Retrieved from http://ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-
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Manufacturing.” Journal of International Economics 105 (2017) 130-149. 
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firms are also less polluting).176 Shapiro and Walker found similar decreases in pollution 
-- a 60 percent drop in emissions from U.S. manufacturing between 1990 and 2008.177 
However, Shapiro and Walker credit changing environmental regulations with the drop in 
pollution rather than the lowering trade costs.178 
Regardless, this data only paints a picture of pollution in the U.S. – it does not 
take into account the higher pollution caused by new U.S. plants opening in Mexico. The 
Environmental Health Coalition gives us a different view: there are now 66 active toxic 
waste sites along the U.S.-Mexican border.179 The host of clean-up projects promised in 
Mexico were either delayed or never begun.180 The maquiladora program, which allows 
foreign companies to set up assembly factories in Mexico to process duty-free foreign 
materials for export, had existed since 1965.181 By 1993 there were more than 2,000 
maquilas in Mexico, with over 80 percent of those along the U.S.-Mexican border.182 In 
the five years after the beginning of NAFTA, the number of maquilas grew by 86 percent 
as compared with 47 percent over the five years prior to the agreement.183 The extent to 
which this increase was due to NAFTA, if at all, is beyond the scope of this paper. But 
the rise of both industry and pollution at the very least cast doubt on NAAEP’s ability to 
176 Ibid. 
177 J.S. Shapiro, and R. Walker. Why is pollution from U.S. manufacturing declining? the roles of trade, 
regulation, productivity, and preferences. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. (2015) 
doi:http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/10.3386/w20879 
178 Ibid. 
179 What We Do, Environmental Health Coalition. 
180 Nancy Nusser,  Environmental promises unfulfilled in Mexico NAFTA has not helped the country solve 
its severe pollution woes. Globe & Mail (Toronto, Canada). (Dec. 23, 1995) 
181 Dr. J. Michael Patrick, “The Impact of NAFTA on Border Maquiladora and Industrial Activity,”
Institute for International Trade (April 1994) at 1, accessed at 
http://texascenter.tamiu.edu/PDF/NAFTA/techrp04.pdf.  
182 Ibid. at 2,3. 
183 William C. Gruben, “Did NAFTA Really Cause Mexico’s High Maquiladora Growth?” Center for 
Latin American Economics Working Paper (July 2001), at 2. Accessed at 
https://www.dallasfed.org/~/media/documents/research/papers/2001/wp0106.pdf.  
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protect the environment from the side effects of free trade. By 2010 several wastewater 
treatment plants in border towns that were supposed to have been begun in 1994 had still 
not begun construction.184  
Prior to 2016, and the U.S. Presidential election that put trade barriers in the 
spotlight, increasing free trade was the order of the day. Moving forward, the United 
States and other countries with environmental priorities should use the waning support 
for free trade as an opportunity to bargain for much stronger environmental protective 
mechanisms within trade agreements. Rather than negotiating environmental side 
agreements, trade agreements should have environmental protection as an substantive 
goal and have real penalties in place for violating standards. At the very least, agreements 
should provide clear language describing what types of environmental regulations are 
valid exercises of state power, protecting states from being targets of sanctions or causes 
of action for merely implementing conservationist principles.  
In November 2018, the leaders of the United States, Canada, and Mexico signed 
what is meant to be a replacement for the existing NAFTA agreement. The United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) includes environmental language not included in 
the original NAFTA, and much that language mimics the intent of the NAAEC.185 Parties 
agree to enforce their own environmental laws and implement processes to assess the 
environmental impact of new laws. Additionally, the complaint mechanism laid out in the 
NAAEP, which allows any person of a party allege that a party is not abiding by its 
184 Ibid. 
185 Congressional Research Service, “In Focus: Proposed U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade 
Agreement (February 22, 2019). Accessed at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10997.pdf. 
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environmental obligations, is now described in the body of the USMCA itself.186 Thus 
the new agreement retains the CEC and the citizen submission process.187  
The USMCA also contains some new language that was not present in either 
NAFTA or the NAAEC. One, parties affirm their commitments under multilateral 
environmental agreements to which they are already a party. Two, parties recognize the 
importance of protecting certain aspects of the environment, including air quality, the 
ozone layer, biodiversity, flora, fauna, and forests. Three, parties must promote trade and 
investment in environmental goods and services.188 One other area where USMCA differs 
from NAFTA is that it prohibits certain types of fishery subsidies, specifically subsidies 
available to vessels and operators and subsidies that negatively affect fish stocks.189    
Though the USMCA echoes much of the protective language present in NAFTA 
and the NAAEP, whether or not this language will translate into effective environmental 
protections is less clear. The International Institute for Sustainable Development has 
expressed doubt that new trade agreement will provide stronger protections than 
NAFTA.190 The director of the Sierra Club’s responsible trade program also reacted 
negatively to the new agreement, stating that its language regarding air pollution is week 
and weakly enforced. The USMCA also guarantees companies an opportunity to 
comment on proposed regulations across borders and requires each country to develop 
processes that consider the effects of the proposed laws on small businesses and on 
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business competition. According to Sierra Club, these provisions could give industry the 
opportunity to delay or change environmentally protective measures throughout North 
America.191 
A coalition of environmental groups, including Sierra Club, has also noted that an 
important provision in the original NAFTA has been removed in USMCA. That 
provision, Article 104 in NAFTA’s Objectives section (discussed supra) clarifies that in 
the event of conflict between the trade agreement and any of five MEAs, the MEAs 
prevail.192 The absence of the phrase could imply that USMCA is meant to supersede any 
other environmental agreements in the event of a conflict.193 
The USMCA does re-prioritize environmental issues by addressing them within 
the main agreement instead of relegating them to a side agreement like NAAEC. 
However, it does so without strengthening the enforcement mechanism as it exists 
through the CEC. The new agreement represents so slight a step forward on 
environmental issues as to be almost inconsequential. Congress has yet to ratify the 
USMCA, which must occur before the agreement goes into effect. Still, until 
environmental infractions are addressed with sanctions and retaliatory measures 
comparable to free trade violations, the protective language that does exist in agreements 
like the USMCA is not likely to force much compliance.
191 Nicholas Kusnetz, “How Trump’s New Trade Deal Could Prolong His Pollution Legacy,” Inside 
Climate News, https://insideclimatenews.org/news/04102018/trump-trade-deal-climate-change-canada-
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